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Abstract: Despite the importance of commitment for distinctively human forms of sociality, 
it remains unclear how people prioritize and evaluate their own and others’ commitments 
- especially implicit commitments. Across two sets of online studies, we found evidence 
in support of the hypothesis that people’s judgments and attitudes about implicit 
commitments are governed by an implicit sense of commitment, which is modulated by 
cues to others’ expectations, and by cues to the costs others have invested on the basis 
of those expectations. 
 
1. Introduction 
The phenomenon of commitment is a cornerstone of human social life. Commitments 
make individuals’ behavior predictable in the face of fluctuations in their desires and 
interests, thereby facilitating the planning and coordination of joint actions involving 
multiple agents (Clark, 2006; Michael & Pacherie, 2015). Moreover, by stabilizing 
expectations about individuals’ future behavior, commitments can also help to support 
cooperation. As such, the origin and stability of everyday social exchanges and 
institutions such as marriage, scientific collaboration, and employment depend upon the 
credibility of commitments. Speech acts such as promises and vows, as well as complex 
social institutions such as contracts, allow the creation of explicit commitments – i.e., 
commitments whose terms are clearly understood and accepted by all parties. But even 
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when commitments are not made explicit, they can nevertheless support the same 
important social functions. Indeed, philosophers such as Margaret Gilbert and Michael 
Bratman have recently emphasized the role of implicit commitments in joint actions, 
based on the idea that joint actions are characterized by the existence of a shared goal – 
the achievement of which is what all parties implicitly commit to1 (Bratman, 1993; Gilbert, 
1990). Despite the importance of implicit commitment for distinctively human forms of 
sociality, it remains unclear how people identify, prioritize and assess their own and 
others’ commitments. 
Imagine, for example, that two colleagues, Polly and Pam, are in the habit of meeting and 
chatting together on the balcony of their office building every afternoon during the coffee 
break (adapted from Gilbert 2006). Even if they have never agreed explicitly to engage in 
this routine, they may over time come to feel much the same as they would if an explicit 
commitment were in place. As a result, if Pam finds herself confronted with some other 
important obligation or enticing alternative on one occasion, she may hesitate before 
breaking the routine she shares with Polly. What factors will influence her judgment as to 
whether it is acceptable to break with the routine? And what factors will shape Pam’s 
response if Polly does fail to show up? Following Michael, Sebanz & Knoblich (2016), we 
hypothesize that people's judgments and attitudes about such situations are governed by 
a sense of commitment, which is modulated by various cues that another agent expects 
one to perform a particular action, such as the history of repeated interaction, and cues 
that another agent may have invested effort or other costs on the basis of that expectation. 
 
This hypothesis builds upon prior research on the role of expectations in demanding and 
motivating prosocial behavior such as maintaining promises or abiding by tacit rules. 
MacCormick and Raz (1978) and Scanlon (1998) hold that promises have normative force 
in situations when the promiser leads the promisee to form certain expectations about her 
(the promiser’s) future behavior. In another highly influential contribution made in the 
                                                 
1 With substantial differences: while according to Bratman commitment is not a necessary 
aspect of shared intentionality, but a characteristic consequence of it, Gilbert holds 
commitment to be a core aspect of shared intentionality: by sharing a goal, subjects are 
implicitly agreeing to be part of a plural subject of the shared goal. 
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context of an analysis of how social practices are established and become self-
reinforcing, Lewis introduces the idea of a ‘presumptive reason’, according to which one 
ought to fulfill others’ preferences when it is the case that one is reasonably expected to 
do so (1969, pp. 97-98; cf. Bicchieri, 2005). Building upon this idea, Sugden (2000) claims 
that one is normatively expected to perform a certain course of action X when such a 
presumptive reason is present, and that one is typically motivated to perform X by means 
of an aversion to frustrating others’ reasonable expectations. Sugden also suggests that 
this aversion mirrors the emergence of a feeling of resentment towards those who have 
frustrated one’s own expectations. 
More recently, some empirical research has begun to test these ideas, and in particular 
to probe the cognitive and motivational mechanisms leading people to feel committed and 
to act accordingly, and to expect the same of others as well. For example, studies using 
game-theoretic paradigms have shown that people’s expectations have a positive impact 
on the behavior of their partners. For instance, Heintz and colleagues (2015) found that 
participants playing the role of dictator in a dictator game made more prosocial choices 
when they explicitly received information about the recipients’ expectations -- provided 
the expectations were reasonable (Cf. also Dana et al. 2006; Ockenfels & Werner, 2012). 
However, when there is no explicit information about others’ expectations, how can 
people become aware of them? Addressing this question, Michael, Sebanz & Knoblich 
(2016) argue that a partner’s investment of effort or other costs in a joint activity may 
provide an implicit cue to that partner’s expectations about one’s contribution to the joint 
activity -- i.e. if the partner were not expecting one to remain committed and to do one’s 
part, then she would be unlikely to invest effort or other costs. Moreover, a partner’s 
investment of effort also provides a cue that the joint activity is of value to her, implying 
that she may be particularly disappointed or annoyed if one did not remain committed and 
do one’s part. This line of reasoning is also motivated by previous findings suggesting 
that the cost invested by one agent in order to allow a partner to obtain rewards has an 
influence on the choices made by the partner (Charness & Rabin 2010). More recently, 
Székely & Michael (2018) also found that the perception of a partner’s investment of effort 
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in a joint activity led participants to remain engaged longer despite increasing boredom2. 
In a 2-player version of the classic snake game which became increasingly boring over 
the course of each round, participants persisted longer when they were given cues of 
their partner’s highly effortful contribution to the game compared to when they were given 
cues of a partner’s low investment of effort. 
While Székely & Michael’s (2018) finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
perception of a partner’s investment of effort led participants to persist longer out of a 
sense of commitment, alternative explanations are also possible. For example, the 
perception of a partner’s effort might have led participants to infer that the task was 
particularly worthwhile. Alternatively, the perception of another agent investing effort may 
have primed them to exert effort as well, irrespective of any sense of commitment to 
another agent. To address these open questions, we designed a pair of experiments 
(Study 1a and Study 1b) to probe participants’ normative judgments and affective 
responses to a scenario in which (as in Székely & Michael’s 2018 study) one agent is 
relying on a second agent who is presented with a temptation to disengage. However, 
whereas Székely & Michael focused on the agent who was presented with the temptation 
(i.e. they were investigating the effect of a sense of commitment upon this agent’s 
motivation), we opted to focus on the other side of the relation. In fact, the effect of a 
sense of commitment implies that while one agent would feel motivated to do what she 
committed to doing, the partner will feel more entitled to expect it to happen, and to blame 
more the first agent if she fails to do it. Thus, we presented participants with vignettes 
describing a scenario in which one agent had a high level of expectation (generated by 
investing a higher degree of effort into a joint activity, i.e. the High Cost Condition) or a 
low level of expectation (generated by investing a lower degree of effort, i.e. the Low Cost 
Condition), and a second agent failed to remain committed, and operationalized the sense 
of commitment in terms of the degree to which participants made negative normative and 
non-normative judgments about the second agent’s violation. 
                                                 
2 Indeed, if it is the case that such cues typically track others’ expectations, then people may 
respond to them by increasing their commitment to joint activities even in cases in which they do 
not in fact reflect a partner’s expectations. 
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We reasoned that if participants made more negative normative judgments and 
reported more negative emotional attitudes in response to the High Cost condition, this 
would be difficult to account for in terms of the aforementioned alternative explanations 
of Székely and Michael’s (2018) finding. Indeed, the priming of the partner’s effort and 
the value of an action to an agent can imply an emotional reaction but does not in itself 
imply any obligation that she has to any other agent to perform the action. This additional 
normative measure we added would therefore provide further support for the hypothesis 
that a partner’s investment of effort in a joint activity triggers a sense of commitment to 
that joint activity. We opted for operationalizing commitment using a 6-point Likert scale 
for the following reason: if the sense of commitment is modulated by cues of another 
agent’s expectations, rather than by a norm-violation per se, we should expect that 
participants’ judgments would vary between conditions in a graded manner rather than in 
a binary manner. 
As a further test of the hypothesis that the sense of commitment is modulated by 
various cues that another agent expects one to perform a particular action, such as the 
history of repeated interaction, we also carried out a second pair of studies (2a and 2b). 
Studies 2a and 2b were designed to probe participants’ normative evaluations and 
affective attitudes in response to scenarios in which one agent failed to remain engaged 
to a joint activity toward which her partner had either a high level of expectation (due to 
having shared a long history of repeated interaction; High Repetition Condition) or a low 
level of expectation (due to having shared only a brief history of repeated interaction; Low 
Repetition Condition). We reasoned that a long history of repeated interaction is likely to 
establish a high degree of expectation of continued interaction, and that the scenario 
described in the High Repetition condition would be likely to elicit more negative 
normative judgments and emotional responses than the scenario described in the Low 
Repetition condition. This line of reasoning is motivated by previous research showing 
that cooperation in social dilemmas such as the prisoners’ dilemma can be boosted if 
participants experience a history of successful coordination -- i.e. in the context of 
behavioral economics paradigms such as the stag hunt (Rusch & Luetge, 2016) or a pure 
coordination game (Guala & Mittone, 2010). Unlike these previous studies, however, the 
current study focused on the perspective of the agent whose expectation was 
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disappointed. Moreover, our paradigm enabled us to investigate people’s attitudes and 
judgments about everyday scenarios with a high degree of ecological validity. 
 
2. Cost and Commitment 
The first pair of studies we conducted was designed to test the hypothesis that an agent’s 
sense of commitment to an interaction is enhanced by her or his partner’s investment in 
the interaction. To this end, we presented participants with vignettes describing everyday 
situations in which an implicit commitment between two agents was violated. We 
operationalized the sense of commitment with a normative measure (i.e. a normative 
question prompting a moral judgment about whether an apology was appropriate), with a 
non-normative, intuitive measure (i.e. an affective question asking whether the situation 
triggered a feeling of annoyance), and with an indirect question about how much time the 
participant herself would be willing to invest to honor the implicit commitment in the 
scenario described in the vignette. 
 
a. Study 1a 
Methods 
We used Amazon M-Turk to implement a web-based paradigm with a between-subjects 
design. Since each participant gave only one judgment for each test question, and since 
online experiments produce greater variability than lab-based experiments, we expected 
a high variability in our dependent variables. We therefore opted for a large sample size: 
200 participants (2 conditions, 100 per group). We included data from those participants 
who had already begun the experiment when M-Turk registered that this number had 
been reached. Our data set therefore comprised 260 adults (124 in High Cost Condition 
and 136 in Low Cost Condition) using Amazon M-Turk. (110 female; Mage = 33.62 years, 
SD = 10.53). No participant was discarded, since none failed the comprehension 
question. The methods used were in accordance with the international ethical 
requirements of psychological research and approved by the EPKEB in Hungary. All 
participants gave their informed consent by ticking a box prior to the experiment. 
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Participants were asked to read a vignette describing a hypothetical situation involving a 
repeated joint activity that gets interrupted. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of 
two between-subjects conditions (High Cost, Low Cost). We manipulated the magnitude 
of costs that an agent invested in order to be able to maintain the joint activity with the 
other agent. In the High Cost condition, the scenario reads as follows: 
High Cost: You and Pam used to work in the same office on the 5th floor, 
until you were moved to a 1st floor office one year ago. Every day for the 
past three years, you and Pam have spent your afternoon coffee break 
sitting out on the 5th floor balcony and chatting, though you never agreed 
to start doing this. After you moved to the new office down on the 1st floor, 
you nevertheless continued to walk up to the same balcony on the 5th floor 
to spend the coffee break with Pam, even though the balcony is five flights 
of stairs up from your new office. The sequence is broken when one day 
you walk all the way up the five flights of stairs and wait for Pam during the 
coffee break, but she doesn’t turn up. 
 
In the Low Cost condition, the vignette differs insofar as the new office is around the 
corner rather than down on the first floor (See Appendix for the full vignette). After reading 
the vignette, participants were asked to respond to the following questions, which were 
presented in this order: 
Normative Question: “On a scale from 0 to 5, to what extent would you agree that Pam 
owes you an apology?” (0= Disagree strongly; 5= Agree strongly). 
Affective Question: “If Pam did not apologize or offer any explanation, how annoyed would 
you be on a scale from 0 to 5?” (0 = not at all annoyed; 5 = highly annoyed) 
Control Question: “In the scenario described above, where is it that you and Pam spend 
the coffee break?” (on the balcony, in the lounge, in the cafeteria) 
Indirect Question: “Now imagine that you’re Pam. The reason why you cannot make it is 
that, while running an errand in town, you learn that your favorite spa is offering free 
admission until 4 pm. It is currently 2:30 pm. You would like to write a text message to 
your colleague back at the office to let her know that you won’t be coming today, but you 
notice that your phone is out of batteries. You plug it in to charge in the car. How long 
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would you be willing to wait in the parking lot for the phone to charge before going in to 
the spa, in order to be able to send a text message to your colleague?” (not at all, 1 
minute, 5 minutes, 10 minutes, 15 minutes, 20 minutes, 25 minutes, 30 minutes) 
 
The normative question was designed to tap participants’ explicit moral evaluations of the 
scenario. We predicted that they would more strongly agree that an apology was in order 
in the High Cost condition than in the Low Cost condition. The affective question was 
designed to tap participants’ more intuitive, emotional reactions to the commitment 
violation described in the scenario. We predicted that participants would indicate a higher 
level of annoyance if no apology or explanation were forthcoming in the High Cost 
condition. The control question was designed to filter out participants who had not read 
the vignette with sufficient care to retain the critical information presented therein. The 
indirect question was intended to tap participants’ appraisal of the commitment indirectly, 
namely by measuring the opportunity cost they themselves would be willing to pay in 
order to uphold the commitment. We predicted that participants would indicate a 
willingness to wait longer in the High Cost condition than in the Low Cost condition. 
 
Results and Discussion 
For the normative question, participants gave higher estimates in the High Cost condition 
(M = 2.38, SD = 1.32) than in the Low Cost condition (M = 1.87, SD = 1.38), t(258) = 
3.007, p = .003, Cohen’s d = 0.37 (small effect size). These results were confirmed by 
additional nonparametric tests, Mann-Whitney U = 6728.500, p = .003 (See Figure 1a). 
Similarly, for the affective question, participants gave higher estimates in the High Cost 
condition (M = 2.28, SD = 1.20) than in the Low Cost condition (M = 1.94, SD = 1.37), 
t(258) = 2.121, p = .035, Cohen’s d = 0.26 (small effect size). These results were 
confirmed by additional nonparametric tests, Mann-Whitney U = 7169.000, p = .032 (See 
Figure 1b). 
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Responses to the indirect question revealed a numerical difference in the same direction, 
with participants giving higher estimates in the High Cost condition (M = 4.01, SD = 4.15) 
than in the Low Cost condition (M = 3.14, SD = 3.47), but this difference did not reach 
statistical significance, t(241) = 1.820, p = .070. Levene’s test revealed a violation of the 
equality of variance assumption, p = .007. 
 
Fig. 1a and 1b. Percentage of responses to the normative (a) and the non-normative question (b). White 
background bars indicate a mild-to-strong agreement, whereas black-background bars indicate a mild-to-
strong disagreement with the statement. In other words, the stronger the agreement, the higher the 
perception of the commitment being violated. 
 
It is worth noting that responses to both the normative and the affective questions tend to 
cluster around the middle of the scale rather than towards the two extremes. For the 
normative question, responses tended to be just below the midpoint both in the Low Cost 
condition (M = 1.87, SD = 1.38, Mdn = 2.00), and in the High Cost condition (M = 2.38, 
SD = 1.32, Mdn = 3.00). For the affective question, responses again tended to be just 
below the midpoint both in the Low Cost condition (M = 1.94, SD = 1.37, Mdn = 2.00) and 
in the High Cost condition (M = 2.28, SD = 1.20, Mdn = 2.00). The findings from Study 1a 
were consistent with our predictions, providing support for the hypothesis that people’s 
sense of commitment to a joint activity can be enhanced as a function of their partner’s 
investment of effort in the joint activity. In order to ensure that our findings were not due 
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to any incidental features of the scenario, we ran a replication study using a different 
scenario, and predicted the same pattern of results. 
 
b. Study 1b 
Methods 
As in Study 1a, we used Amazon M-Turk to implement a web-based paradigm with a 
between-subjects design, aiming for a sample size of 200 participants (2 conditions, 100 
per group). We again included data from those participants who had already begun the 
experiment when M-Turk registered that this number had been reached. Our data set 
therefore comprised 205 adults. After discarding the data from participants who failed the 
control question or failed to complete the questionnaire (N = 5), the final sample included 
200 participants (105 female; Mage = 38.18 years, SD = 11.85) -- 94 in High Cost Condition 
and 106 in Low Cost Condition. The research was carried out in accordance with the 
international ethical requirements of psychological research and approved by the EPKEB 
in XXX. All participants gave their informed consent by ticking a box prior to the 
experiment. 
 
The procedure was identical to the procedure of Study 1a, except that we implemented a 
different scenario and different control questions (See Appendix for the full vignette). 
The questions were presented to the participants in a randomized order, except for the 
indirect question, which was always presented last. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The results of Study 1a were replicated. For the normative question, participants again 
gave higher estimates in the High Cost condition (M = 2.56, SD = 1.46) than in the Low 
Cost condition (M = 1.79, SD = 1.39), t(198) = 3.828, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.54 (medium 
effect size). These results were confirmed by additional nonparametric tests, Mann-
Whitney U = 3484.000, p < .001 (see Figure 2a). For the affective question, participants 
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again gave higher estimates in the High Cost condition (M = 2.50, SD = 1.41) than in the 
Low Cost condition (M = 1.68, SD = 1.28), t(198) = 4.317, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.61 
(medium effect size). These results were confirmed by additional nonparametric tests, 
Mann-Whitney U = 3318.000, p < .001 (see Figure 2b). 
Responses to the indirect question showed the expected pattern, with participants giving 
higher estimates in the High Cost condition (M = 4.29, SD = 2.73) than in the Low Cost 
condition (M = 4.05, SD = 2.85), but there was again no statistically significant difference 
between the two conditions, t(198) = .606, p = .545. 
 
Fig. 2a and 2b. Percentage of responses to the normative and the non-normative question. White 
background bars indicate a mild-to-strong agreement, whereas black background bars indicate a mild-to-
strong disagreement with the statement. In other words, the stronger the agreement, the higher the 
perception that a commitment had been violated. 
 
We again found that responses to both the normative question and the affective question 
tended to cluster around the middle of the scale rather than towards the two extremes 
(see Figure 3). Indeed, for the normative question, responses tended to be around the 
midpoint both in the Low Cost condition (M = 1.81, SD = 1.40, Mdn = 2.00) and in the 
High Cost condition (M = 2.57, SD = 1.45, Mdn = 3.00). For the affective question, 
responses tended to be around the midpoint both in the Low Cost condition (M = 1.70, 
SD = 1.29, Mdn = 2.00), and in the High Cost condition (M = 2.52, SD = 1.41, Mdn = 
2.00). 
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Fig. 3. Distribution of responses to the normative question. Although in the Low Cost condition there is a 
significantly higher percentage of responses at the lower end of the scale than in the High Cost condition, 
we can see that the largest number of participants in both groups give responses just above the midpoint 
of the scale. 
 
The findings from Study 1b replicate those from Study 1a in a different scenario, which 
constitutes strong evidence for our hypothesis that one’s sense of commitment to a joint 
activity can be enhanced as a function of her partner’s investment of effort in the joint 
activity. 
 
3. Repetition and Commitment 
The second pair of studies was designed to test the hypothesis that the repetition of a 
joint activity can enhance people’s sense of commitment to that joint activity. To this end, 
we presented participants with vignettes describing everyday situations in which an 
implicit commitment between two agents was violated. We again operationalized the 
sense of commitment with both normative and non-normative measures (i.e. with the 
normative, the affective and the indirect question), as we did in Studies 1a and 1b. We 
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marked in bold those parts of the text that implemented the manipulation (i.e. the phrases 
‘three years’ and ‘three days’) in order to ensure that participants would not fail to notice 
these apparently minor details which might be overlooked by a casual reader. 
 
a. Study 2a 
Methods  
As in Studies 1a and 1b, we used Amazon M-Turk to implement a web-based paradigm 
with a between-subjects design, and again aimed for a sample size of 200 participants (2 
conditions, 100 per group). As in the previous studies, we included data from those 
participants who had already begun the experiment when M-Turk registered that this 
number had been reached. Our data set therefore comprised 210 adults. After discarding 
the data from participants who failed one or more control questions (N = 14), the dataset 
included 196 data from participants, 97 in the High Repetition Condition and 99 in the 
Low Repetition Condition (109 female; Mage = 37.74 years, SD = 11.62). The research 
was carried out in accordance with the international ethical requirements of psychological 
research and approved by the EPKEB in Hungary. All participants gave their informed 
consent by ticking a box prior to the experiment. 
The procedure employed was the same as Studies 1a and 1b. The scenario reads as 
follows: 
High Repetition: You and Pam work in the same office building. Every day 
for the past 3 years, you and Pam have spent your coffee break sitting out 
on the balcony and chatting, though you never agreed to start doing this. 
The sequence is broken when one day you walk up to the balcony and wait 
for Pam during the coffee break, but she doesn’t turn up. This is surprising 
given that it hasn't happened in the past 3 years. 
 
In the Low Repetition condition, the vignette differs insofar as the coffee break routine 
was initiated only three days rather than three years earlier (See Appendix for the full 
vignette). 
Again, participants were asked to respond to normative and non-normative questions. In 
light of participants’ feedback to a pilot version of the study, we opted to introduce a milder 
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normative measure than that used in Studies 1a and 1b. Specifically, we asked 
participants to evaluate whether the partner who had violated the implicit commitment 
owed them an explanation (rather than an apology). Also, we opted for an implicit question 
that was tailored to the manipulation of repetition rather than costs -- i.e. rather than 
probing participants’ willingness to pay a cost to honor the commitment (as in Studies 1a 
and 1b), we asked about their willingness to resume the routine. The questions were 
presented to the participant in the following order: 
 
Normative Question: “On a scale from 0 to 5, to what extent would you agree that Pam 
owes you an explanation?”. (0= Disagree strongly; 5= Agree strongly) 
Affective Question: “If Pam did not apologize or offer any explanation, how annoyed would 
you be on a scale from 0 to 5?” (0 = not at all annoyed; 5 = highly annoyed) 
Implicit Question “How interested would you be in spending your coffee break with Pam 
the next day?”. (Not at all interested, Hardly interested at all, A bit interested, Somewhat 
interested, Quite interested, Highly interested) 
Control Question: “In the scenario, where is it that you and Pam spend the coffee break?” 
(On the balcony, At the cafeteria, In the lounge) 
As in the previous studies, the normative question was designed to tap participants’ 
explicit moral evaluations of the scenario. We predicted that they would more strongly 
agree that an explanation was in order in the High Repetition condition than in the Low 
Repetition condition. The affective question was designed to tap participants’ more 
intuitive, emotional reactions to the commitment violation described in the scenario. We 
predicted that participants would indicate a higher level of annoyance if no apology or 
explanation were forthcoming in the High Repetition condition. The control question was 
designed to filter out participants who had not read the vignette with sufficient care to 
retain the critical information presented therein. The implicit question was intended to tap 
participants’ implicit appraisal of the commitment, namely by measuring their willingness 
restore the routine if they were in the position of the individual described in the scenario. 
Despite the fact that no straightforward prediction logically follows from our theory, we 
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reasoned that participants would indicate a lower willingness to restore the routine in the 
High Repetition condition than in the Low Repetition condition, as the violation of the 
commitment in the former condition would have more serious consequences: this would 
be the case because people might deploy partner choice strategies following the violation 
of a commitment. If so, then the more severe the violation, the more serious would be the 
consequences for the violator. 
 
Results and discussion 
For the normative question, participants gave higher estimates in the High Repetition 
condition (M = 3.13, SD = 1.54) than in the Low Repetition condition (M = 2.10, SD = 
1.34),  t(189) = 5.014, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.73 (medium effect size). Since the sample 
failed Levene’s Test for equality of variance (p = .018), we also conducted nonparametric 
tests, which yielded consistent results, Mann-Whitney U = 2890.000, p < .001 (see Figure 
4a). 
For the affective question, participants again gave higher estimates in the High Repetition 
condition (M = 3.03, SD = 1.66) than in the Low Repetition condition (M = 1.87, SD = 
1.17), t(172) = 5.659, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.86 (large effect size). Since the sample 
failed Levene’s Test for equality of variance, (p < .001), we again conducted 
nonparametric tests, which again yielded consistent results, Mann-Whitney U = 2841.500, 
p < .001 (see Figure 4b). These results confirm our prediction, providing support for the 
hypothesis that a joint activity which has been repeated over a longer period of time elicits 
a stronger sense of commitment than a joint activity that has been repeated only over a 
short period of time. 
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Fig. 4a and 4b. Percentages of responses to the normative and to non-normative question. White 
background bars indicate a mild-to-strong agreement, whereas black background bars indicate a mild-to-
strong disagreement with the statement: in other words, the stronger the agreement, the higher the 
perception that a commitment has been violated. 
 
The opposite pattern of results was found for responses to the implicit question. 
Participants indicated a higher degree of willingness to restore the previous routine after 
a commitment violation in the High Repetition Condition (M = 5.02, SD = .85) than in the 
Low Repetition condition (M = 4.45, SD = 1.03), t(189) = 4.186, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 
0.64 (medium effect size). The sample failed the Levene’s Test for equality of variance, 
p = .005. Nonetheless, this pattern of results is confirmed by a nonparametric test, Mann-
Whitney U = 3302.500, p < .001 (see Figure 5). Although these findings are not consistent 
with our prediction, we believe that they can be explained by hypothesizing that a longer 
history of interaction gives rise to a more stable sense of commitment, which continues 
to bind the two partners even after minor violations such as the ones described in both 
scenarios. 
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Fig. 5. Percentage of responses to the 
implicit question. White background bars 
indicate a mild-to-strong disinterest, 
whereas black background bars indicate a 
mild-to-strong interest in restoring the 
previous routine: in other words, the 
stronger the interest, the greater the 
perception that a commitment is in place. 
 
As in the previous studies, we found that responses did not cluster at the extreme ends 
of the scale, but tended to be distributed homogeneously across the scale (i.e. 
distributions were not skewed). For the normative question, responses tended to be right 
around the midpoint both in the Low Cost condition (M = 2.22, SD = 1.40, Mdn = 2.00), 
and in the High Cost condition (M = 3.18, SD = 1.54, Mdn = 3.00). For the affective 
questions, responses tended to be around the midpoint both in the Low Cost condition 
(M = 2.01, SD = 1.30, Mdn = 2.00), and in the High Cost condition (M = 3.07, SD = 1.66, 
Mdn = 3.00). 
As previously designed, we ran a replication study with a different scenario, and we 
predicted the same pattern of results. 
 
b. Study 2b 
Methods 
As in the previous studies, we used Amazon M-Turk to implement a web-based paradigm 
with a between-subjects design, and again aimed for a sample size of 200 participants (2 
conditions, 100 per group). We again included data from those participants who had 
already begun the experiment when M-Turk registered that this number had been 
reached. Our data set therefore comprised 203 adults. After discarding the data from 
participants who failed the comprehension question (N = 12), the sample included 191 
participants, 90 in High Repetition Condition and 101 in Low Repetition Condition (112 
female; Mage = 40.49 years, SD = 13.38). The procedure was identical to Study 2a. The 
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research was carried out in accordance with the international ethical requirements of 
psychological research and approved by the EPKEB in Hungary. All participants gave 
their informed consent by ticking a box prior to the experiment. 
 
The procedure was identical to the procedure of Study 2a, except that we implemented a 
different vignette and different control questions (See Appendix for the full vignette). 
The questions were presented to the participants in a randomized order. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The results of the previous study were replicated. For the normative question, participants 
gave higher estimates in the High Repetition condition (M = 2.29, SD = 1.51) than in the 
Low Repetition condition (M = 1.39, SD = 1.44), t(189) = 4.236, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 
0.62 (medium effect size). This pattern of result is confirmed by nonparametric tests, both 
for the normative measure, Mann-Whitney U = 2995.500, p < .001 (see Figure 6a). For 
the affective question, participants again gave higher estimates in the High Repetition 
condition (M = 1.93, SD = 1.44) than in the Low Repetition condition (M = 1.29, SD = 
1.42), t(189) = 3.110, p = .002, Cohen’s d = 0.45 (medium effect size). This pattern of 
results is confirmed by nonparametric tests, Mann-Whitney U = 3370.500, p = .002 (see 
Figure 6b). 
Fig. 6a and 6b. Percentage of responses to the normative and non-normative questions. White background 
bars indicate a mild-to-strong agreement, whereas black background bars indicate a mild-to-strong 
disagreement with the statement: in other words, the stronger the agreement, the higher the perception that 
a commitment has been violated. 
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As in Study 2a, responses to the implicit question exhibited the opposite pattern to what 
we had predicted. Participants reported being more willing to restore the previous routine 
after a commitment had been violated following a longer repeated interaction, giving 
higher estimates in the High Repetition condition (M = 5.04, SD = .96) than in the Low 
Repetition condition (M = 4.44, SD = 1.10), t(189) = 4.020, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.58 
(medium effect size). The sample failed the Levene’s Test for equality of variance, p = 
.008. Nonetheless, this pattern of results was confirmed by a nonparametric test, Mann-
Whitney U = 3073.000, p < .001 (see Figure 7). 
 
Fig. 7. Percentage of responses to the 
implicit question. White background bars 
indicate a mild-to-strong disinterest, whereas 
black background bars indicate a mild-to-
strong interest in restoring the previous 
routine: in other words, the stronger the 
interest, the greater the perception that a 
commitment is in place. 
 
 
As in the previous set of studies, we again found that responses to both the normative 
question and the affective question tended to cluster around the middle of the scale rather 
than towards the two extremes (see Figure 8). For the normative question, responses 
tended to be around the midpoint both in the Low Repetition condition (M = 1.53, SD = 
1.54, Mdn = 1.00) and in the High Repetition condition (M = 2.31, SD = 1.50, Mdn = 3.00). 
For the affective question, responses tended to be around the midpoint both in the Low 
Repetition condition (M = 1.43, SD = 1.52, Mdn = 1.00) and in the High Repetition 
condition (M = 1.97, SD = 1.45, Mdn = 2.00). 
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Fig. 8. Distribution of responses to the normative question. Although in the Low Repetition condition there 
is a significantly higher percentage of responses at the lower end of the scale, we can see that in the High 
Repetition condition the largest number of participants give responses right around the midpoint of the 
scale. 
 
 
4. General discussion 
 
In Studies 1a and 1b, we presented participants with vignettes describing a scenario in 
which one agent had either high expectations (generated by the investment of either a 
high degree of effort into a joint activity, i.e. the High Cost Condition) or low expectations 
(generated by a low degree of effort into a joint activity, i.e. the Low Cost Condition), and 
a second agent failed to remain committed. In line with our predictions, the results 
revealed that participants made more negative normative judgments and reported more 
negative emotional attitudes in response to the High Cost condition than the Low Cost 
Condition. Studies 2a and 2b were designed to probe participants’ normative evaluations 
and affective attitudes in response to scenarios in which one agent failed to remain 
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engaged to a joint activity toward which her partner had either high expectations 
(generated by a longer history of repeating the routine, i.e. the High Repetition Condition) 
or low expectations (generated by a shorter history of repeating the routine, i.e. the Low 
Repetition Condition). Again, the results confirmed our predictions: the scenario 
described in the High Repetition condition elicited more negative normative judgments 
and emotional responses than the scenario described in the Low Repetition condition. 
Taken together, these results provide support of the hypothesis that people’s judgments 
and attitudes about implicit commitments are governed by an implicit sense of 
commitment, which is modulated by cues to others’ expectations, and by cues to the costs 
others have invested on the basis of those expectations.  
Previous studies have shown that the opportunity cost paid by a partner incentivizes 
prosociality (Charness & Rabin 2010), and that a partner’s apparent investment of effort 
costs in a joint task increases the people’s persistence on the task (Székely & Michael 
2018). These previous findings regarding the relevance of costs for implicit commitment, 
however, are also consistent with alternative explanations. The costs invested by a 
partner in order to engage in a joint task can also be interpreted as a cue to the value of 
the task itself, leading to higher persistence in the task. The same is true of another 
convergent line of research showing that participants with a history of successful 
coordination tend to behave more cooperatively when facing a social dilemma (Guala & 
Mittone, 2010; Rusche & Luetge, 2016), although it is tempting to interpret such findings 
as evidence that repeated coordinated interaction might signal reciprocal expectations, 
and that people may therefore be sensitive to such cues when reasoning about reciprocal 
commitments. By using both normative and non-normative measures, we were able to 
rule out alternative explanations. Specifically, our finding that participants were more likely 
to judge that an apology was in order in the conditions in which we had induced 
participants to perceive a higher degree of implicit commitment, a pattern consistent with 
the non-normative, emotional responses, and that cannot be explained by appealing to 
an increase in the perceived value of the task. In other words, the fact that responses to 
the normative and the non-normative questions provided a consistent picture suggests 
that people were not simply expressing their frustration with the outcome presented in the 
experiment or their disappointment about having missed out on a valuable activity, but 
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that costs and repetition are two factors that are reliably interpreted as cues to others’ 
expectations. Both the normative and the non-normative (affective) questions reliably 
elicited higher estimates in the High Cost/ High Repetition conditions. This clearly 
supports the hypothesis that these two factors enhance people's sense of commitment in 
joint activity. 
In Studies 1a and 1b, investigating the role of costs, responses to our indirect question 
manifest the same trend, but the difference did not reach statistical significance. This may 
be because our measure was too weak to pick up on participants’ willingness to pay a 
cost in order to maintain the commitment, or because it was too unrealistic -- participants 
might have enough familiarity with charging phones to assess that four minutes should 
be enough to be able to send a message. In Studies 2a and 2b, investigating the role of 
repetition, the implicit measure yielded the opposite results to what we had predicted. Our 
rationale in formulating that question was that the longer the history of repeated 
interaction, the greater the disapproval of a violation of the routine. This, we predicted, 
would lead participants to be less inclined to resume the previous routine following a 
violation. What this rationale did not take into account, however, is that the longer history 
of interaction may also give rise to a more stable sense of commitment, which may 
continue to bind the two partners even after a minor violation. Thus, although the 
observed results did not confirm our prediction, we believe that they are indeed highly 
consistent with our hypothesis. 
Our results provide further empirical evidence in support of some influential theories of 
social norms according to which people ought to fulfil others’ preferences when they are 
reasonably expected to do so (Lewis, 1969; Bicchieri, 2005). The notion of reasonable 
expectation is at the core of Lewis’ Presumption Reason: Agent A’s expectation that agent 
B will perform an action X is reasonable if A has well-grounded reasons to believe that A 
will do X. According to Sudgen, this moral principle rests upon features of human 
psychology that enable a motivation to abide by it, such as an aversion to disappoint 
others’ reasonable expectations (Sudgen, 2000). And indeed, it has been found that 
people exhibit an aversion to disappointing others’ expectations when those expectations 
have been made explicit, but only when these expectations were not unreasonable 
(Heintz et al. 2015). Our results provide further empirical evidence in support of these 
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theories of social norms, demonstrating that people judge there to be an obligation to fulfil 
others' reasonable expectations even when these expectations have not been made 
explicit (but have been implicitly cued). 
Our findings also have important implications for theorizing about the relationship 
between implicit and explicit commitments (e.g., promises). According to an influential 
theory of promises (see, Scanlon, 1998), the moral ground for the norm that we ought to 
keep our promises (and, presumably, explicit commitments in general) is that promises 
generate expectations (i.e. promising to do X creates in the recipient the expectation that 
the speaker will do X). As shown by our studies, others’ (reasonable) expectations also 
ground implicit commitments in people’s moral judgments. Thus, it might be argued that 
explicit and implicit commitments share the same moral ground, i.e. that we ought to act 
in accordance with the expectations others have of us. 
Also related to theoretical research on promises, our findings challenge the idea 
of promissory commitment as a binary notion, according to which either one is committed 
(i.e., if all conditions for promising are met), or one is not committed (Searle, 1969). This 
way of conceptualizing promises leaves little room for the idea that recipients’ desires and 
expectations might modulate the promisor’s sense of commitment in a graded manner. 
Since promise-breaking is considered to be a violation of a specific norm (i.e., a violation 
of the norm that one ought to keep one’s promises; see Hume, 1739/1978), one might 
predict that if there was an expectation that the speaker would perform a certain action, 
violating a promise to perform that action would always be considered blameworthy (on 
both normative and affective measures) -- independently of the magnitude of the 
expectation. In contrast to this, we found that given a 6-point scale, participants’ 
assessments of commitment were distributed at intermediate points along the scale rather 
than at opposite poles. These results foster the idea that for implicit commitments, people 
assess accountability in a graded manner. Future studies could investigate the effect of 
recipient’s mental attitudes on normative and emotional measures of commitment 
violation when the commitment has been created by a promise, which may challenge the 
philosophical conception of promises as binary sources of commitment. 
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Finally, our findings open up several new avenues for additional further research 
on implicit commitment. For instance, they raise the question whether different kinds of 
costs (time, effort, money, etc) may elicit a sense of commitment in different ways, which 
may be reflected in different reparation strategies or in reactions other than moral 
disapproval. Moreover, while we focused on those costs agents pay to enter into or to 
carry out a joint activity, it would be interesting to investigate the effects of costs that 
agents pay as a consequence of commitment violations. Finally, it would be interesting to 
investigate whether people’s responsiveness to cues such as those implemented in our 
studies has an impact on subsequent partner choice. 
To sum up, our studies shed some light on the way people prioritize and evaluate 
commitments, showing that people are not only sensitive to others’ expectations in 
judging whether commitments are in place, but that they even “sense” commitments when 
expectations are only implicitly cued (e.g., by the amount of costs that one agent is 
investing in the interaction and by the history of repeated interactions). This sensibility 
allows people to act together and respond to each others’ expectations even in the 
absence of explicit agreements, promises, or contracts, and might even be at the basis 
of the norms that define these acts.  
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